Victory for Hire: Private Security Companies Impact on Military Effectiveness by Molly Dunigan

Author:Molly Dunigan [Dunigan, Molly]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Political Science, Political Freedom, General, Security (National & International), Technology & Engineering, Military Science
ISBN: 9780804774598
Google: AZJtWi-zF4IC
Publisher: Stanford University Press
Published: 2011-02-28T03:39:26+00:00

Iranian military’s quality to at least a limited extent, or they would not have been valued—and hence purchased—by Iran.133 Furthermore, since the United States was not involved in training or professionalizing the Iranian army in any way, the United States cannot be said to have improved the latter’s skill.

The effect of U.S. support to the efficiency of the Nicaraguan contras is more difficult to judge. In 1986, support from the U.S. administration to the contras was nothing new. The contras were a disparate collection of anti-Sandinista factions whose own ideological intentions differed, although two major fronts emerged among them as a result of the merger of smaller factions: the Nicaraguan Democratic Force based in Honduras and the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance based in Costa Rica.134 Since their formation in 1981, the contras had enjoyed considerable U.S. backing for a guerilla war waged against the Sandinista government, in which an estimated 40,000 were killed.135 The Boland Amendment outlawed direct covert U.S. funding to the contras, although funding to third parties who were sheltering contras and/or engaged in anti-Sandinista activities was allowed to continue, with conditions.136 Even after the Sandinistas won 67 percent of the popular vote in 1984, the latter type of U.S. funding continued, but the scandalous element of the Iran-Contra affair was that Oliver North authorized diverted funds for providing weapons directly to the contras once again, as well as to third parties.

It is unclear precisely what the contras got in terms of weaponry during the period under review. In addition to shipments arranged through North, the CIA channeled Soviet-type munitions that Israel had confiscated from the PLO in 1982 and the United States had subsequently acquired.137 Assessing the quantity of arms provided, Lumpe notes that:

Although the full extent of covert arms aid to the contras has never been established, the available documentation suggests that it was substantial. In one memo sent to CIA Director William Casey in July 1986, retired Major General John Singlaub (a key figure in the covert supply operation) discussed a pending delivery of 10,000 Kalashnikov AKM assault rifles, 200 RPG-7 rocket launchers, 200 60mm mortars, 50 82mm mortars, 60 112.7mm machine guns, 50 SA-7 portable surface to air missiles, and related ammunition. Other evidence of large arms shipments comes from the transcripts of radio communications between the contras and their contacts at the CIA. On April 12, 1986, for instance, a rebel field commander radioed a CIA official to acknowledge that his forces had received an airdrop of 20,000 pounds of military equipment, including German type G3 assault rifles, rifle magazines and ammunition, RPG-7 rockets, grenades, and grenade launchers. Because supply operations of this type were conducted on a regular basis for several years, it is clear that substantial quantities of small arms and other light weapons were given to the contras during this period. These supply operations would have continued had not an Enterprise-owned Fairchild C-123K cargo plane been shot down on October 5, 1986 . . .138

The military quality of the contras was clearly enhanced through the provision of such weaponry.

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